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Abstract 
 
This report summarizes probable causes and contributing factors that led to a rocket 
motor initiating prematurely while employees were preparing instrumentation for an 
AIII rocket sled test at SNL/NM, resulting in a Type-B Accident.  Originally prepared 
by the Technical Advisory Team that provided technical assistance to the NNSA’s 
Accident Investigation Board, the report includes analyses of several proposed causes 
and concludes that the most probable source of power for premature initiation of the 
rocket motor was the independent battery contained in the HiCap recorder package.  
The report includes data, evidence, and proposed scenarios to substantiate the 
analyses. 
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1.  ACCIDENT SUMMARY  
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
On October 9, 2008, at approximately 4:40 p.m., an accident occurred while a contract 
employee and three Sandia National Laboratories (Sandia) employees were preparing 
instrumentation for an AIII rocket sled test at the 10,000-foot sled track located in Area III at 
Sandia.  The purpose of the regularly scheduled test was to evaluate the performance of 
MC4152 thermal batteries during a simulated B61 penetration environment.  The accident 
occurred when a rocket motor ignited prematurely.  The contractor employee sustained a 
compound fracture of the femur and first- and second-degree burns on his hands and arms; he 
was airlifted to the hospital where he underwent emergency surgery.  The other three 
employees initially reported ringing in the ears and possibly impaired hearing; two were 
taken to the hospital and released, and the other declined immediate treatment. 
 
In response to the accident, the National Nuclear Safety Administration (NNSA) declared the 
event a Type-B Accident, thereby requiring an external investigation board to lead the 
accident investigation.  The NNSA created such a team—called the Accident Investigation 
Board (AIB)—composed of personnel from the Sandia Site Office and from Kirtland  
Air Force Base (AFB).  This team worked with Sandia representatives from the rocket sled 
test site to document and collect evidence.  In response to a request from the AIB, Sandia 
established a Technical Advisory Team (TAT) to provide technical assistance, advice, and 
recommendations to the AIB as to the probable causes and contributing factors of the 
accident. 
 
1.2 Accident Details 
 
The accident involved the unexpected initiation of a Zuni Mk 71 Mod 1 rocket motor as 
engineers and technicians were preparing a test payload for use.  The details of the hardware 
configuration, as described to the TAT at the time of the accident and immediately thereafter, 
were as follows: 
 
 The rocket sled appeared to function as intended, eventually ending up in the position 
down the track as planned for this shot and as experienced in the preceding four tests. 
 
 The unexpected initiation occurred as a technician was installing an indicator light 
emitting diode (LED) plug, as designed and planned, on the J2 connector on top of the 
payload box. 
 
 A shorting plug (shunt) was in place across the rocket initiator. 
 
 Two MC4152 thermal batteries had not been initiated either intentionally or 
unintentionally. 
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 The firing set box planned to set off the rocket initiators was not connected to the rocket 
structure in any way. 
 
2.  TECHNICAL ADVISORY TEAM MEMBERSHIP 
 
The TAT members were selected from across Sandia to provide a broad technical capability 
from which to provide technical advice, study, investigation, and analysis for the Accident 
Investigation Board (AIB).  To prevent any conflict of interest from affecting decisions or 
analyses, the personnel selected were not members of the organizations that experienced the 
accident.  The following members were selected: 
 
 Anthony Medina,  TAT Leader, Director of Energetic Components Center 
 Jaime Moya, Senior Manager of Explosive Technology Group and mechanical engineer 
experienced in field test and explosive operations 
 Greg Scharrer, Department Manager and explosives expert 
 Ron Franco, Department Manager and electronics engineer familiar with payloads of the 
type used in these tests 
 Steve Heffelfinger, Department Manager and former sled track operations manager 
 Jerry Stofleth, firing systems engineer experienced in explosive field test operations 
 Mike Dinallo, electromagnetic analyst (for electrostatic discharge and radio frequency 
analysis) 
 Kathy Alam, chemist 
 Kevin Howard, electromagnetic measurement technician 
 Clint Haslett, electronics technician 
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3.  PROPOSED CAUSES OF THE ACCIDENT 
 
As part of its role in assisting the AIB, the TAT performed background studies of all the 
separate components and subsystems involved in the sled track experiment in order to 
provide technical information, analysis, and opinions for the AIB.  As part of these studies, 
the TAT held a brainstorming meeting to identify all the possible initiation methods that 
could have caused the premature initiation of the rocket.  For each possible initiation 
method/source, the TAT followed through and performed rudimentary analyses to ascertain 
which scenarios were realistic, which scenarios could immediately be dismissed as not 
possible, and what follow-on activities could be pursued to evaluate those that appeared most 
promising.  The scenarios identified by the TAT are listed separately in sections 3.1 through 
3.6 below, along with the TAT’s opinion on whether or not the scenario was a realistic 
potential cause of the premature ignition.  For those that appeared to have a higher 
probability of likelihood, the TAT performed further studies and measurements and compiled 
evidence and documentation associated with each.  (That evidence is summarized in each 
section below, and documentation is included in the appendices to this report.). 
 
 
3.1 Proposed Cause A:  Rocket Propellant Self-Initiated 
 
The TAT investigated the possibility that the propellant of the rocket self-initiated or was 
initiated by phenomena other than the designed-in initiators.  The rocket propellant is a 
double-based fuel of approximately 49 percent nitrocellulose (12.6 percent N), 40.6 percent 
nitroglycerin, and six more constituents of small quantities.  Because of its constituents, the 
propellant needs to have sufficient stabilizer to ensure it does not self-heat through a 
decomposition process and self-ignite.  (These propellants are stabilized at the time of 
manufacture with ingredients that react with nitrogen oxide decomposition products.  
However, as the level of stabilizer diminishes over time to the point that it can no longer 
consume the decomposition products, the decomposition rate may accelerate and may, in 
certain cases, produce spontaneous ignition through self-heating.  An increased 
decomposition rate may also cause energetic materials to become more sensitive to initiation 
stimuli, thus making them more hazardous to handle, store, or transport.)  Sandia’s Explosive 
Storage Review Committee (ESRC), established in early FY08 and chaired by Senior 
Scientist Dr. Anita Renlund, is charged with reviewing the stability of such devices and lot 
sampling the explosive material to ensure it is sufficiently safe.  The committee has taken 
samples from rocket motors of the type used in the accident, but it has not filed its formal 
report on the test results.  However, per an email from Jeff Cherry, manager of the sled track 
operation, the testing indicated that the stabilizer was at an acceptable level and was not a 
concern for self-ignition or significantly enhanced sensitivity to other means of ignition (see 
copy of e-mail in Appendix A). 
 
Furthermore, were the rocket to have self-ignited as a result of the decomposition process 
described above, it would not have operated as intended because the ignition would have 
occurred in the center of the missile, where the thermal runaway process would have 
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occurred.  It would not have occurred near an edge because it would have lost heat to the 
outside, thereby eliminating the hazard. 
 
 
3.2 Proposed Cause B:  Electrostatic Discharge Initiated the Initiator 
 
The TAT investigated the sensitivity of the initiator to electrostatic discharge (ESD) and the 
amount of energy and/or power that could have potentially been delivered to the initiators.  
(Information on the initiators is contained in Appendix B.)   
 
The markings on the actual rocket motor under consideration indicate that it was an Mk-71, 
Mod 1 system.  Figure 1 was taken from the actual motor by Ed Garavaglia (Sandia National 
Laboratories) for verification. 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  Data Taken from Spent Rocket Motor 
 
Two igniter types are used in the Mk 71 motor (Naval Air Systems Command).  The Mod 2 
version of this rocket contains an igniter that is certified to not be susceptible to ESD and 
hazards of electromagnetic radiation ordnance (HERO).  The Mod 1 version of this rocket 
motor (this motor type) is considered ESD and HERO susceptible, meaning that ESD and 
electromagnetic (EM) energies should be considered as potential ignition sources. 
 
Igniter 
 
The igniter used in this rocket motor was an Mk 282 Mod 0 igniter (assuming original 
equipment).  This igniter (see Figure 2) consists of a steel can containing two each Mk 1 Mod 
0 electric squibs connected electrically in parallel and filled with approximately 35 grams of 
BKNO3 propellant (see Appendix B). 
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Reproduced with permission of Franklin Physics 
 
Figure 2.  Mk 282 Mod 0 Igniter 
 
Each squib consists of a 1-ohm bridge-wire coated with a pyrotechnic material 
(DDNP/KClO4) surrounded by 75 mg of black powder (see Figure 3). 
 
 
 
       Reproduced with permission of Franklin Physics 
 
Figure 3.  Mk 1 Mod 0 Squib 
 
Two squibs are connected electrically in parallel and mounted inside the igniter can.  One 
lead from each squib is bonded to the inside of the metallic igniter can.  The other lead from 
each squib is connected together and soldered to an electrically isolated binding post inside 
the igniter can.  This single “high-side” lead is routed through the isolated terminal assembly 
to a contact band external to the igniter assembly, which is mounted inside the rocket.  The 
“low-side” squib pin, squib case, igniter, and igniter assembly are all conductive, and when 
mounted in the rocket, they make electrical contact with the rocket motor case, making the 
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rocket motor case the same electrical potential as the low-side pin of each squib.  (See 
Appendix B, Figure B-4.) 
 
Squib 
 
This type of initiator (squib) functions via a required combination of electrical power and 
energy.  The specific response to these power and energy parameters may be characterized 
through various methods of analysis.  We were able to discover multiple sets of historic test 
data from which to derive some measure for these power and energy requirements. 
 
To first order, a device such as the Mk-1 squib (see Appendix B, Figure B-3) functions on 
total heat accumulated in its bridge-wire while under electrical impetus.  The heat is 
accumulated by electrical current passing through the bridge-wire (effectively a 1-ohm 
resistor), while at the same time, the heat is being dissipated (or conducted out of the bridge-
wire) through conduction to its surroundings.  The explosive initiates when the bridge-wire 
reaches a certain critical temperature.  This dynamic requires a minimum energy to change 
the temperature of the bridge-wire, and it also requires a minimum power (rate of energy 
delivery) to ensure thermal dissipation is overcome. 
 
This initiation requirement for this squib can, at first order, be described via a hyperbolic 
relationship between power and energy, along with some associated statistical uncertainty.   
If the energy AND power are at minimum levels, the initiator will fire—this relationship is 
regular, but not constant except for very high levels of power (where minimum energy 
should be constant) or very high levels of energy (where minimum power should be 
constant). 
 
Typically, when testing for these parameters, a multitude of measurement obstacles must be 
overcome.  A variety of strategies and standards have been developed over the years to attend 
to these obstacles, but coupled with manufacturing variations, these processes naturally lead 
to a statistical assessment of the power and energy parameters.  As well, various techniques 
provide for specific results for a particular configuration.  Therefore, absolute results from 
various techniques will not be exactly the same.  For example, results from a capacitor 
discharge test technique will produce comparable values for a capacitor discharge firing 
circuit.  However, a capacitor discharge is neither constant power nor constant energy and, 
therefore, it cannot be easily plotted on the curve in Figure 4 below.  If, however, the curve is 
known entirely, then the likelihood of initiation can be derived mathematically. 
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Figure 4.  Power and Energy Relationship for Mk 1 Mod 0 Squib 
 
 
Firing Data 
 
Firing energies from the Electric Initiator Handbook are derived through the discharge of a 
1-f capacitor into a single Mk 1 Mod 0 squib.  The results are shown in Table 1: 
 
Table 1.  Energy from Discharge of 1-f Capacitor into Mk 1 Mod 0 Squib 
 
Function Probability % Charged Capacitor (1f ) Energy in Capacitor 
(mJ) 
95 67 volts 2.24 
50 57 volts 1.63 
5 50 volts 1.25 
 
No-fire 
below curve 
E-min 
P-min 
Power 
Fire 
above curve 
Energy 
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Values for squib initiation data derived from Hampton and Gaylor were derived from 
constant current energy sources.  The energy stimulus data shown in Table 2 were derived 
from the firing of 8,000 squibs. 
 
Table 2.  Energy from Firing of 8,000 Squibs 
 
Function Probability % Firing Energy (mJ) 
99.60 1.79 
97.14 1.33 
70.22 1.10 
4.17 0.96 
2.13 0.91 
0.35 0.88 
 
 
The final resource (Morbach) describes the results from a power stimulus.  The data shown in 
Table 3 were derived from a 100-squib Bruceton test.  These data are for DC to RF 
frequencies and are therefore applicable to constant power sources through EM-
generated/coupled sources: 
 
Table 3.  Power from 100-Squib Bruceton Test  
 
Function Probability Firing Power (watts) 
99.9% @ 90% confidence (“all-fire”) 0.143 
50% 0.097 
0.1% @ 90% confidence (“no-fire”) 0.065 
 
These data will be compared to the levels derived later for likely ESD initiation sources. 
 
 
Electrostatic Discharge (ESD) 
 
There are two basic methods by which these squibs may be initiated:  (1) pin-to-pin flow 
through the bridge-wire and (2) and pin-to-case (or case-to-pin) arcing. 
 
In examining the Mk 282 igniter, we can rule out the pin-to-case scenario, assuming the ESD 
path originates at the rocket motor/sled body.  If the ESD path originated anywhere else in 
the proposed system, the path to ground would have been through the firing cable, and not 
through the squibs.  The pin-to-case scenario then becomes a case-to-pin path, where an ESD 
impetus is applied to the rocket motor case, travels through the igniter assembly, through the 
igniter, to the case of the squib(s), and then arcs to the low-side pin.  However, this cannot 
occur because this pin is connected directly to the igniter body, making the pin and case 
electrically common.  A secondary scenario may have the arc jump to the high-side pin, but 
this cannot occur either—the path of least resistance to this pin is through the low-side pin, 
and through the bridge-wire, and then on to ground.  (See Figure 5.) 
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Figure 5.  Proposed Scenario in Which ESD Could Have Reached Initiators 
 
 
Pin-to-Pin 
 
We evaluated several scenarios associated with a pin-to-pin ESD initiation with a 
commercial off-the-shelf electrical engineering and analysis software and modeling package.  
The circuit model used for ESD source is the Fisher Human ESD model (Barnum), which is 
widely accepted and utilized by the Department of Energy (DOE).  Several other models 
provide various levels of threat for this configuration, but we chose this model as our 
standard.  We connected this severe human body ESD (SHBESD) model to a 0.6-ohm load, 
which represents two squibs in parallel and the associated resistances in the igniter 
configuration.  (See Figure 6.)  This resistance value is a close estimate based on the actual 
reading recorded just before the rocket motor event.   
 
Again, we assumed the ESD path initiated at the rocket motor case (or sled body) and 
propagated through the squibs to earth ground through multiple paths. 
 
Ungrounded rocket body 
Connector 
J2-case 
1.2 ohm1.2 ohm
0.403 
ohm 
0.445 
ohm 
0.050 ohm shunt
Electrostatic 
discharge Initiator 
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Figure 6.  SHBESD into 0.6-Ohm Load 
 
 
Analysis 1 
 
Our first analysis modeled the HESD standard discharged directly into a 0.6-ohm resistor.  
The dynamic response can be seen in the plots in Figure 7 below.  The current and voltage 
waveforms are multiplied together and then integrated to provide a total energy value, and 
this value is then divided by two to provide the energy level modeled for a single squib—
assuming the two resistors are exactly balanced (which is likely).  Below are the current and 
voltage traces: 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.  Current and Voltage  
 
 
Allowing these waveforms to extend out in time and settle to zero, and then integrating, we 
get a value of 0.123 mJ per squib. (See Figure 8.) 
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Figure 8.  Waveforms Extended in Time 
 
Analysis 2 
 
The second model included the effect of the 100-foot Reynolds Type-C firing cable of 
nominal impedance that was attached to the initiator.  These analyses actually considered 
several variations of this configuration driven by uncertainties in the cable connections:  
squibs connected to the 100-foot firing cable with the firing cable (1) shorted and grounded, 
(2) grounded but not shorted, (3) shorted but not grounded, and (4) not shorted and not 
grounded.  After discussion amongst the TAT, we concluded that only one of these variations 
was plausible (the first one), as physical evidence suggested that the firing cable was indeed 
shorted and grounded prior to the event.  As well, we ran models with ESD imposed at the 
sled body and at the far end of the firing cable.  Again, we discount the ESD impetus at the 
far end of the firing cable based on physical and logical evidence.  For the only viable 
variation to this squib-cable configuration, we used the representation shown in Figure 9. 
 
 
 
Figure 9.  Variation to Squib-Cable Configuration 
 
The circuit representation is shown in Figure 10: 
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Figure 10.  Circuit Representation 
 
 
The energy accumulated in one squib from this configuration is negligible. 
 
As an aside, if the cable was not grounded (shorted or not), an ESD pulse from the Fisher 
Model results in about 0.123 mJ of energy through each squib.  This analysis is not shown 
for the reasons given above. 
 
Analysis 3 
 
In the final analysis, we increased the ESD impetus by using the Institute of Electrical and 
Electronics Engineers (IEEE) model for human and furniture combined.  Those parameters 
are shown in Table 4 below. 
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Table 4.  IEEE Model for Human and Furniture Combined 
40 kV 
Component or parameter  IEEE 62.47 PESD   IEEE 62.47 FESD    
Body capacitance (Cb)  60 to 300 pF (300 pF)  60 to 300 pF (300 pF)    
Body inductance (Lb)  0.5 to 2 μH (0.5 μH)   0.02 to 0.1 μH (0.02 μH)    
Body resistance (Rb)  150 to 1500 Ω (150 Ω)  2 to 90 Ω (2 Ω)    
Hand capacitance (Ch)  3 to 10 pF (10 pF)   3 to 20 pF (20 pF)    
Hand inductance (Lh)  0.05 to 0.2 μH (0.05 μH)  <0.01 μH (0.01 μH)    
Hand resistance (Rh)  20 to 200 Ω (20 Ω)   <20 Ω (20 Ω). 
 
The results are the same as for the last analysis—the energy coupled to the squibs is 
negligible, provided the cable is grounded.  The short on the cable has no effect on the 
analysis—the key factor is the cable being grounded.  Without a ground connection at the far 
end of the cable, the energy through each squib could reach up to 42mJ with this aggressive 
representation of an ESD pulse. 
 
Indeed, this is why this igniter is considered ESD and HERO susceptible.  If the squibs are 
not properly grounded, they can easily be set off by a reasonable ESD pulse, especially one 
generated by the loading of this rocket into a helicopter tube. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In comparing the minimum firing energy from a capacitive discharge testing to the energy 
that could be imposed by the Fisher model for SHBESD, we find a discrepancy of about an 
order of magnitude.  The energy required for 5 percent reliability is reported as 1.250 mJ.  
The energy generated into the squibs via the SHBESD model is 0.123 mJ when there is no 
cable attached.  This is approximately 1/10th of the required energy for a very low probability 
of firing. 
 
This result is considered the only viable scenario for ESD directly into the squibs.  We have 
shown that there is no method for pin-to-case or case-to-pin initiation via ESD.  We are 
assuming through physical evidence that the firing cable was grounded at the far end to earth 
ground.  The shorting plug at the end of the cable is of no consequence if the cable is not 
grounded.  With the cable grounded, the energy that can accumulate in the squibs is 
negligible.  With the cable not grounded, and more severe ESD input, enough energy can 
indeed accumulate in the squibs to initiate a reaction—again, however, we have discounted 
this case.  We have verified the cable impedance to be within manufacturer specifications.  
(See Appendix B for additional data.) 
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3.3 Proposed Cause C:  Radio-Frequency Energy Fired the Initiator 
 
Purpose 
 
Radio frequency (RF) analysis established an estimate of the power received by the rocket 
propellant detonator leads due to the radio frequency environment. 
 
Background (Cable Loops, Dipoles, and Transmission Line Models) 
 
The range of RFs that can be present at the rocket sled track location spans the low kilo-hertz 
through several hundred mega-hertz frequency range.  Due to the different RF coupling 
approaches, which are RF-wavelength-dependent relative to the length of the initiator cable, this 
broad-band of frequencies typically is divided into three bands and corresponding coupling 
models.   
 
The longer wavelengths or lower frequency range (~ 1 kHz to 100 kHz; actual frequencies will 
depend on length of cable) typically models the cable as a loop antenna.  This loop 
predominantly couples or picks up the RF ambient environment magnetic field component and 
determines an open circuit voltage that drives an impedance load producing RF loop current.  At 
the shorter wavelengths or higher frequencies (~ 10 MHz to 1 GHz; again specific frequency 
range is cable length dependent) typically models the cable as a dipole antenna.  This dipole 
predominantly couples with the electric field component that produces a voltage across and 
current through each side of the dipole wire lengths.  The intermediate frequency band (100 kHz 
to10 MHz) models the cable as a transmission line producing voltage and current proportional to 
line impedance parameters.  Each of these modeling approaches can be evaluated using closed 
form analytic techniques and finite difference or finite element numerical methods, in either the 
time or frequency domains.  These approaches and methods are readily available in the 
electromagnetic literature (textbooks, journals, agency reports). 
 
Model Approach (Dipole Model) 
 
Known power and frequency band of RF emitters are used to decide what frequency band-based 
model (loop, dipole, or transmission line) is appropriate to estimate ambient RF-field-induced 
voltage and current on exposed electrical conducting cables.  Knowing that hand-held Motorola- 
made ASTRO XTS 500 (5 watt) radios are present during sled track test activities and that the 
communication band is in the several 100- to 1000-MHz range, an electric dipole model can be 
used to estimate safe track-side operational RF environments’ electric field strength.  Other RF 
emitters can similarly be modeled once emitter power and frequency range is established at the 
sled track site. 
 
Since a dipole model is appropriate to estimate power received by detonator leads, the V-curve 
method for establishing acceptable distances from RF transmitters can be used.  However, an 
estimate of power received by the detonator leads using implicit formulation of V-curve 
transmitting and receiving dipole antenna characteristics will be used. 
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Model Calculations 
 
The power received (Prec) by a dipole antenna representing the track sled test fixture and rocket 
body is power density incident (Pinc) at the receive dipole, times the receive dipole power 
effective (capture) area (Arec), written as: 
 
 
Prec = Pinc * Arec. 
 
The expression for Arec is, 
 
Arec = (2 /4)*Gr , 
 
Gr is the gain of the receive antenna and is the corresponding wavelength associated with RF 
power density frequency f (i.e., =c/f, where c is speed of light).  The power transmitted at the 
RF source is Pt and relates to the power density at the dipole as, 
 
 
Pinc = Pt *Gt/(4R2), 
 
Where Gt is the transmitting antenna gain and R is the distance between the transmitter 
(Motorola radio) and receive antenna (sled track test fixture).  
 
Using transmit and receiving gains of 1.5 (for < /2 short dipole antennas) at a separation 
distance R of 3-meter (from the track to meet far field criteria) and a 5-watt transmitter power at 
the low frequency end 100MHz ( = 3 meters), the power received is 
 
Prec = Pt *Gt * Gr * (/4R)2 = 0.071 watts. 
 
Similarly, at the upper RF frequency 1GHz ( = 0.3 meters) and gains of 1.5, the power received 
is 0.0007 watts (0.7mW).  These power levels can be compared to the all-fire level of 1.35 watts 
and the no-fire level of 0.05 watts. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In comparing the minimum firing energy from a capacitive discharge testing to the energy that 
could be imposed by these RF coupling phenomena, we found a discrepancy of about more than 
an order of magnitude for the higher frequency (1 GHz ) scenario.  We therefore discounted this 
frequency band from further analysis.  At the low frequency band (100 MHz) the potential power 
coupled into the system is comparable to the no-fire level of the initiator; however, because this 
firing level still maintains an approximate 5 percent probability of firing the initiator, we 
conducted further analysis. 
 
We analyzed the circuit into which this energy would be coupled.  The diagram for this circuit is 
shown in Appendix C.  Were 0.070 watts to be coupled into the initiator circuit, this energy 
would be available as a current within the circuit containing the initiators and the shorting plug 
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(shunt).  The power would therefore be shared based on the impedance ratios of the components.  
Analysis of the way the RF power would be distributed within the initiator circuit shows the 
amount of power available to each initiator would be significantly below the no-fire power for it.  
We therefore concluded this was not a likely source of premature initiation of the rocket motors. 
 
3.4 Proposed Cause D:  Thermal Batteries Fired the Initiator 
 
Tests were being conducted to evaluate the performance of the MC4152 thermal batteries in 
a simulated environment that was to be provided by the rocket sled test.  Thermal batteries 
(called devices under test, or DUT, in the experiment documentation package) are inert 
devices that require activation before becoming an active battery.  When inert, they provide 
absolutely no power at their output connections.  They are activated by firing an initiator 
similar to that of the Zuni rocket initiator. 
 
Two thermal batteries were in the experimental package.  The thermal batteries were to be 
activated immediately before rocket initiation, and their output voltage was to be monitored 
by the HiCap recorder during the entire duration of the rocket movement on the track.  The 
TAT hypothesized that these thermal batteries, if activated, could have been a potential 
source of energy to cause the premature initiation of the rocket.  In addition, if their 
activation signal could have been mistakenly routed to the rocket initiators, this could have 
had a potential effect. 
 
In conjunction with the AIB, the TAT inspected the thermal batteries present during the 
accident.  Each of the two devices was evaluated and characterized as NOT having been fired 
during the activities of October 9.  Their bridge-wires were completely intact and provided 
impedance values expected of unfired units.  This conclusively eliminated the thermal 
batteries as a potential source of energy causing the premature initiation of the rocket. 
 
During the evaluation of the signal wires that would have been used to activate the thermal 
batteries, the TAT determined that the firing lines were not connected in a way that would 
have provided a potential path to the rocket initiator.  The C-cable was not connected to the 
fireset, and there was no potential path to the rocket initiator.  The ground wire from this 
signal pair could not have provided a separate path to earth. 
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3.5 Proposed Cause E:  HiCap Recorder Battery Fired the Initiator 
 
The TAT investigated the possibility that the batteries that powered the HiCap recorder 
instrument were the source of the rocket sled initiation.  The batteries used for this 
application are Panasonic Lithium Ion Prismatic Series CGA batteries.  The batteries have a 
nominal open-cell voltage of 3.7 volts each; three of these batteries were used in series for 
this application, resulting in a battery potential voltage of 11.1 volts, maximum.  The actual 
battery stack voltage was measured at 10.8 volts, which is within the expected operating 
voltage range.  (In the following discussion, the three cells will be referenced as a single 
battery.)  The battery is charged before use of the recorder package to ensure it has sufficient 
charge to power to the HiCap recorder instrumentation package.  The battery is live 
(producing voltage and current) during all phases of the integration of the HiCap recorder 
box into the rocket sled test configuration. 
 
An analysis of the current-sourcing capability of the battery was performed to ascertain 
whether or not the battery was capable of producing the currents necessary to initiate the 
rocket motor initiators.  The specifications on the battery indicate the battery has an internal 
impedance of 0.20 ohms.  An impedance of this low value indicates the battery would be able 
to produce upwards of 40 amperes for a short period of time (when heat would degrade 
battery performance or the battery would catch on fire).  This level of current is over an order 
of magnitude higher than necessary to fire the rocket motor initiator.   
 
During the investigation into the current sourcing capability of the HiCap recorder battery, 
the TAT discovered that the HiCap recorder also uses a “super capacitor” in parallel with the 
battery.  This circuit configuration is used to ensure that the battery/supercapacitor can source 
surge currents without disrupting the battery voltage—in essence, it is a filter to ensure the 
HiCap recorder circuitry does not encounter power-source glitches during times of high 
current usage.  The addition of this supercapacitor component makes the HiCap recorder 
power system even more capable of providing the necessary power for rocket motor 
initiation.  It makes the power system perform as a voltage source, capable of supplying 
almost unlimited current for very short time periods (microseconds to milliseconds).   
 
Given the capacity of this power source, the TAT investigated the possibility that this energy 
was somehow available outside the HiCap recorder package.  The TAT investigated 
connections, both intended and unintended, for both the power and ground connections for 
the HiCap battery.  The TAT measured the resistance and capacitance between all pins of the 
J2 connector, which is the expected connection path into the HiCap recorder package.  All 
connector resistances and capacitance values were well within expected values and did not 
indicate a surreptitious current path to the detonators.  However, during the performance of 
these measurements, the AIB representative informed the TAT of a suspicious black mark 
that looked like a charring path on the J2 connector:  this might have been indicative of a 
short circuit arc.  The mark was centered on Connector J2, Pin 4, which is the pin on which 
the HiCap recorder battery power is brought outside the package for the LED indicator 
module.  Investigating this J2-Pin 4 circuit, the TAT identified that the battery power was 
brought to this pin WITHOUT any current limiting resistance.  In essence, the full power of 
the battery was available on this pin should a ground path back to the battery be identified.   
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The TAT then investigated potential grounding paths for the connection to the HiCap 
recorder battery negative terminal.  It identified a path on the HiCap enable cable used to 
trigger the HiCap recorder to start recording just prior to rocket motor initiation.  This ground 
connection was found to exist without any current limiting resistance.  The ground was due 
to a short in the facility wiring (see Appendix E, Figure E-9).  Note that the facility wiring 
should have been isolated from ground, but due to a fault in the facility wiring, it was, in fact, 
grounded.  The TAT thus concluded that this was a very likely source for the surreptitious 
path to rocket motor initiators and a high probability cause of the accident.  The TAT 
therefore stood down until permission was obtained from the AIB to investigate this further.  
A discussion of the follow-on investigation is contained in section 5, Analysis Leading to 
Proposed Cause of Premature Rocket Motor Initiation. 
 
3.6 Proposed Cause F:  Firing Set Initiated the Initiators 
 
The TAT considered the possibility that the field test firing set may have malfunctioned, 
thereby prematurely igniting the rocket motor.  However, information obtained from the AIB 
and personnel performing the test established that the firing set was not connected to the 
rocket in any manner at all.  This absolutely eliminated this as a potential cause of the 
incident.  Appendix F contains a photo of the test firing set. 
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4.  TESTING AND MEASUREMENTS COMPLETED TO SUBSTANTIATE 
TECHNICAL ANALYSIS  
 
Table 5.  Battery Test MDM 51 
 
MDM 51 P 
 
PIN #   DESCRIPTION 
1 Ch 1 + 
2 Ch 1 – 
3 Ch 2 + 
4 Ch 2 – 
5 Ch 3 + 
6 Ch 3 – 
7 Ch 4 + 
8 Ch 4 – 
9 Ch 5 + 
10 Ch5 – 
11 Ch 6 + 
12 Ch 6 – 
13 Ch 7 + 
14 Ch 7 – 
15 Ch 8 + 
16 Ch 8 – 
26 Ch 9 + (model 7270 accel) 
27 Ch 9 – (model 7270 accel) 
42 Ch 9 (+ power for accel) 
46 Ch 9 ( gnd for accel) 
28 Ch 10 + (trigger accel) 
29 Ch 10 – ( trigger accel) 
43 Ch 10 (+ power for trigger accel) 
47     Ch 10 ( gnd for trigger accel) 
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Table 6.  Continuity Checks at Test Site by Explosives Safety Personnel 
 
Continuity Checks with Fluke Meter (Calibrated) and Simpson Meter Not Calibrated) 
From Item To Item Status Remarks 
Fire set Location 
Ground Strap 
connected to body of 
the Fire set 
Ground Strap Body 
Cable Clamp 
Good Grounding Strap has three clamps 
Ground Strap Body 
Cable Clamp 
Ground Strap 
Backside Cable 
Clamp 
Good Grounding Strap has three clamps 
Ground Strap 
connected to body of 
the Fire set 
Ground Strap 
Backside Cable 
Clamp 
Good Grounding Strap has three clamps 
Backside Ground 
Source Unpainted 
Ground Strap Body 
Cable Clamp 
Good Grounding Strap has three clamps 
Backside Ground 
Source Painted 
Ground Strap Body 
Cable Clamp 
Bad Grounding Strap has three clamps 
East Rail Location 
Wrist Strap  Wrist Strap at Band Good None 
Wrist Strap  East Rail Bad None 
Wrist Strap Clamp East Rail Bad None 
Wrist Strap  East Rail Bad None 
Wrist Strap  Wrist Strap Clamp Good None 
Wrist Strap  Wrist Strap Good None 
East and West Rail 
East Rail  West Rail Bad None 
East Rail  East Rail Bad Half way between 44 an 45, Did 
finally get good check at a rust 
spot 
East Rail  East Rail Bad Half way between 46 an 47, Did 
finally get good check after 
rubbing away at the rail 
Wrist Strap on ground South of Fire set Location 
Ground Strap Body 
Cable Clamp (#1) 
Ground Strap Mid-
Body Cable Clamp 
Good Grounding Strap has three clamps 
Ground Strap Mid-
Body Cable Clamp 
Ground Strap Body 
Cable Clamp (#3) 
Good Grounding Strap has three clamps 
Sled and Rocket Motor Location 
West Rail Sled Shoe  Bad Right Front Shoe 
Sled Shoe Sled Shoe Good Right Front Shoe 
West Rail West Rail Bad None 
West Rail West Rail Bad Simpson Meter, only very slight 
deflection 
Sled Rocket Motor Nozzle Good None 
Shoe  Sled & Rocket Motor Good None 
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Table 7.  Resistance and Capacitance Measurements Taken by TAT 
Personnel  
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5.  ANALYSIS LEADING TO PROPOSED CAUSE OF PREMATURE 
ROCKET MOTOR INITIATION  
 
After completing the set of analyses identified in section 3 of this report, the TAT concluded 
that the most probable source of power for the premature initiation of the Zuni rocket motor 
was the independent battery contained in the HiCap recorder package (the scenario described 
in section 3.5).  The TAT consulted with the chair of the AIB and received permission to 
pursue the investigation to determine if an actual scenario could be developed, based on 
evidence and measurements taken by the TAT and AIB, showing how this battery energy 
could have reached the rocket motor initiators. 
 
After comprehensively compiling the electronics schematics of the HiCap recorder, the 
connector wiring of the rocket sled test setup, a review of the activities being performed at 
the time of the accident, and an evaluation of the shorting plug wiring, the TAT identified a 
probable circuit path that could have caused the premature ignition of the rocket motor.  This 
theory was developed based entirely on data the AIB provided to the TAT and measurements 
performed by the TAT in the presence of AIB personnel.  The TAT believes this is the most 
probable cause of the accident.  If requested by the AIB or other authorities, the TAT 
believes a re-enactment of this proposed scenario could demonstrate the fundamental 
premises of how the energy from the battery in the HiCap recorder package reached the 
rocket motor initiators. 
 
In developing this causal theory, the TAT believes the following issues are paramount to 
understanding how this energy reached the rocket motor initiators. 
 
Significant Issues 
 
 The HiCap recorder had an internal 10.8-volt battery.  The battery connection was 
brought outside the package to Pin 4 on the outside J2-connector.  This battery 
connection was NOT current limited with a series resistor.  The internal impedance of the 
battery was calculated to be 0.2 ohms from data contained in the battery specification 
data (see Appendix E, Figures E-13 and E-14). 
 
 The HiCap recorder has an exposed miniature MDM 25-pin connector with metallic 
exposed pins labeled as Connector J2.  The case of the J2 connector is electrically 
connected to the housing and, therefore, to the rocket body.  There was potential evidence 
of arcing present on the connector body next to J2 - Pin 4 (see Figure 11, Figure 12, 
Figure 13, and Figure 14 below), although extensive chemical analysis of this evidence is 
still in process to definitely identify the marks as char or not.  Although evidence of 
charring would greatly substantiate this proposed scenario, the TAT believes the proposal 
is still valid without evidence of charring.  Not all short circuits will produce combustion 
products.    
 31 
  
 
Figure 11.  Clean, New Connector 
 
 
Figure 12.  Connector from Accident 
 
Figure 13.  Close-Up of Pins 3-4 
 
Figure 14.  Close-Up of Connector Pin 
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 Ground connections to the sled track rail are suspect unless the rails are severely scraped 
to remove rust.  Information provided to the TAT indicated that this level of scraping 
and/or grinding on the rails was not conducted prior to the accident (See Figure 15).  
Measurements performed by personnel from Safety Engineering 4122 and repeated by 
TAT personnel showed lack of electrical connectivity between the rails, wrist straps to 
rail, and wrist strap clamp to rail.  These measurements are listed in section 4 of this 
report.  The result is a likely case of an ungrounded (floating) missile case. 
 
 
 
Figure 15.  Ground Clamp on Sled Track Rail 
 
 Detonators are parallel redundant with resistance of 1.2 ohms each (see Appendix B for 
details on the initiators).  The safety shorting plug (shunt) was located at the end of 106 
feet of C-cable.  The resistance of the cable was measured at 0.414 ohms for the center 
conductor and 0.478 ohms for the shield.  The detonator shorting plug was also grounded 
to earth ground at the junction/panel box as shown in Figure 16 below. 
 
  
 
 
Figure 16.  Shunting Plug Ground Connection 
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 The battery ground was brought outside the package with a dedicated wire that was one 
of a pair of wires used to trigger the HiCap recorder to start recording.  The battery 
ground was NOT current limited.  This connection was found to be grounded to earth 
ground at the junction/panel box due to a short in the facility wiring.  Note that the 
facility wiring should have been isolated from ground, but due to a fault in the facility 
wiring, it was, in fact, grounded.  The wire was connected to the panel box as shown 
below in Figure 17. 
 
 
 
Figure 17.  Panel Box Connections of Signal Wires 
 
 
 
Figure 18.  HiCap Recorder Showing Loose Signal Wires 
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Results 
 
The resulting situation was a case where a potential closed circuit path from the positive 
terminal of the HiCap recorder battery positive to the HiCap recorder battery negative was 
identified.  The only gap in this hypothesized circuit is the connection from the HiCap 
recorder Connector J2-Pin 4 to the case of either the connector or to the rocket body itself.  
The TAT hypothesizes that this final connection (from J2-Pin 4 to J2-Case) occurred when 
the explosives technician was inserting the LED indicator module into the J2-connector and 
accidentally shorted J2-Pin 4 to the case of Connector J2.  Note that the case of this LED 
module is metal and would have easily provided the conduction path necessary to close this 
circuit.  (Refer Appendix E, Figures E-2 through E-4.)This would have created a short circuit 
between the two points and would have completed the circuit between the HiCap recorder 
battery and the rocket motor initiators.  (Grounding conditions at the time of the accident 
cannot be verified, but post-test measurements have shown that the resistance between the 
sled and the sled track rail varied between 6 ohms and infinite ohms, depending on how the 
sled was rocked.) 
 
From information provided by the AIB to the TAT, personnel present during the accident 
distinctly heard a noise that sounded like an arc or static discharge just before the rocket 
motor ignited.  The TAT believes the scenario proposed above could have produced such a 
noise.  Please note that the TAT did not speak with personnel involved in the accident.   
 
Per the discussion above, the site configuration that would have resulted is depicted in Figure 
19 below, which shows each of the salient components that played a role in the proposed 
accident scenario. 
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Figure 19.  Key Components of Scenario 
 
From this scenario, the TAT performed key measurements and analyses to characterize the 
situation to enable a closed-form calculation of the current that could be provided to the 
rocket motor initiators.  The resulting lumped-sum equivalent electrical circuit of the scene at 
the time of the accident is shown below in Figure 20.  In it, one can see that the resulting 
current provided to each of the individual rocket motor initiators was estimated to be 1.97 
amperes, which is substantially above the Zuni rocket motor initiator all-fire current level of 
1.5 amperes.  A current of this value is essentially guaranteed to fire the initiators and 
commence rocket motor ignition. 
HiCap 
Recorder 
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Connector 
J2-Pin 4
Ungrounded Rocket Body
Connector
J2-Case
1.2 ohm
10.8 V
Battery
1.2 ohm
0.403 ohm 0.445 ohm
0.050 ohm Shunt
Connector J3
Pin 5
Detonator Current =    10.8 volts (.297)    = 1.97 amps  > 1.5 amp all-fire
2 (0.813) ohms
LED Module
Initiators
0.30 ohm
0.20 ohm
 
 
Figure 20.  Resulting Electrical Circuit 
 
 
After identifying this as the cause of the accident, the TAT brainstormed to identify why it 
had not happened in any of the recent tests involving the exact hardware used in the accident.  
The following key reasons were identified: 
 
 The proposed scenario requires an ungrounded rocket motor body.  During the time 
impedance measurements were being taken between the rocket motor chassis and ground, 
the TAT observed that the grounding was erratic.  By leaning the rocket motor body in 
different directions, one could change the impedance measures dramatically.  It should be 
noted that leaning the rocket motor body from between the tracks in the direction outside 
the tracks (as a technician would do if he were working on the payload while stationed 
between the tracks) seemed to be the worst direction for providing a grounded rocket 
chassis.  Note that this was a post-fact observation and may not completely or accurately 
describe the situation before the accident. 
 
 The completion of the electric circuit requires the shorting of Connector J2-Pin 4 to the 
case of Connector J2 when the LED module was being inserted.  Were this not to happen, 
the electrical path described in this section would not have been completed and no current 
would have flowed as hypothesized. 
 
The TAT proposes that Sandia fund a follow-on activity to identify the root causes of the 
situations leading up to this accident and that appropriate corrective actions to be taken to 
prevent similar situations from occurring in the future. 
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APPENDIX A:  ROCKET PROPELLANT SELF-INITIATED – EVIDENCE 
CONSIDERED 
 
 
 
Figure A-1.  Stability Sampling Plan E-Mail 
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APPENDIX B:  ELECTROSTATIC DISCHARGE INITIATED THE 
INITIATOR – EVIDENCE CONSIDERED 
 
 
Reproduced with permission of Franklin Physics. 
 
Figure B-1.  Mk1 Mod0 Squib Data 
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Reproduced with permission of Franklin Physics 
 
 Figure B-1.  Mk1 Mod0 Squib Data, continued 
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Reproduced with permission of Franklin Physics 
 
Figure B-1.  Mk1 Mod0 Squib Data, continued 
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Reproduced with permission of Franklin Physics 
 
 
Figure B-2:  MK 282 Mod 0 Igniter Information 
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Reproduced with permission of Franklin Physics 
 
 
Figure B-3:  MK1 Squib 
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Figure B-4.  Firing Current  
 
 
 
 Figure B-5.  Wrist Strap 
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APPENDIX C:  RADIO-FREQUENCY ENERGY FIRED THE INITIATOR – 
EVIDENCE CONSIDERED 
 
 
 
Figure C-1.  Hand-Held Radio Used for Sled Track Activities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure C-2.  Radio Frequency Power Calculation 
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2 
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APPENDIX D:  THERMAL BATTERIES FIRED THE INITIATOR – 
EVIDENCE CONSIDERED 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Intentionally left blank 
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APPENDIX E:  HICAP RECORDER BATTERY FIRED THE INITIATOR – 
EVIDENCE CONSIDERED 
 
 
 
 
Figure E-1.  Ground Clamp 
 
 
 
 
Figure E-2.  Connector View of LED Module 
 
 48 
 
 
 
Figure E-3.  Side View of LED Module 
 
 
 
Figure E-4.  LED Schematic 
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Figure E-5.  HiCap Electrical Interfaces 
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Figure E-6.  HiCap Pen External Connection 
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Figure E-7.  HiCap Pen Internal Connection 
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 Figure E-8.  HiCap Flowchart 
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Figure E-8.  HiCap Flowchart, continued 
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Figure E-9.  HiCap External Trigger Voltage Path   
Unintentional ground due to 
faulty facility wiring 
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Figure E-10.  Sled Test Setup with HiCap Computer Connected 
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Figure E-11.  Sled Test Setup with HiCap (Ready for Rocket Motor Initiation) 
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Figure E-12.  Entire Accident Electrical Schematic 
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Reproduced with permission of Panasonic. 
 
Figure E-13.  Lithium Ion Prismatic Batteries: CGA Series Specifications 
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Reproduced with permission of Panasonic. 
 
Figure E-14.  Lithium Ion Batteries: Individual Data Sheet 
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APPENDIX F:  FIRING SET INITIATED THE INITIATORS – EVIDENCE 
CONSIDERED 
 
 
 
 
Figure F-1.  Fire Set Planned for Use to Initiate Rocket Motor Initiators 
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